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This article analyses the extent and nature of private authority in global political
economy by examining one of its most publicised instances, the World Econ-
omic Forum (WEF).1 In Davos, Switzerland, the annual meetings of the WEF
have attracted the world economic and political e´lite for more than 30 years.
Appraisals of the WEF diverge widely. For many years, Le Monde Diploma-
tique, the French monthly close to the anti-neoliberal globalisation movement,
has described the World Economic Forum as ‘the meeting place of the masters
of the world [which] has undoubtedly become the centre of hyperliberalism, the
capital of globalisation, and the main home of the “pense´e unique” ’.2 George
Soros, the well known hedge-fund manager turned philanthropist, has described
the meetings of Davos, of which he is a regular participant, as a ‘big cocktail
party’.3 These contrasting views on the influence and power of the WEF in
global politics and economy mirror the position of those holding such claims:
those closely associated with the Forum are inclined to deny its power and those
fiercely opposed are likely to emphasise its overarching influence. From a
theoretical perspective, however, these opposing views express disagreement on
one outstanding feature of the changes associated with ‘globalisation’: the
significance of new agents in the global political economy beyond states and
markets.
With the rising importance attributed to non-state actors in world politics, the
issue of private authority has gained increasing prominence in the recent
literature on contemporary international relations. This body of literature ex-
plores the relationship between political authority and economic power by
considering its articulation with new patterns and agents that shape the political
economy of the present world. The field of enquiry is broad: it encompasses the
study of private global corporate actors as well as non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), the appropriation of knowledge and its diffusion through media
networks and think-tanks as well as transnational organised crime and neo-mer-
cenary trends embodied in private military companies.4 In her pioneering
investigations of these new large unexplored areas of research, Susan Strange
suggested that future analyses should explore more precisely ‘the extent and
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limits of non-state authority’.5 In the burgeoning literature, however, the object
of private authority, the nature of its power and its relation to the state remain
unclear. Following Cutler, the prospects for locating authority in the global
political economy now turns on the all-inclusive ‘nexus between economics and
politics, private and public activities, and local and global political economies’.6
In respect of world-wide e´lite groups, critics are prone to denounce their
undemocratic power, whilst more mainstream opinion is keen to condemn the
conspiracy theory that underpins such a view and would even deny that such
groups may have any relevance in research on private authority. The search for
evidence of the power of such groups is a conundrum for scholarly analyses. The
influence of an e´lite club on a particular issue of global politics hinges, by
definition, on loose and informal channels of power. This rules out the conclu-
sions which might be drawn from an evidence-based enquiry following a
relational conception of power focused on the links between the resources and
control over outcomes. As Stone argues with regard to global think-tanks,
establishing such causal nexus is ‘fraught with methodological problems’.7 A
relational conception of power cannot retrace the links between a position held
within the confinement of a club to its eventual translation into a formal political
decision. A structural conception of power emphasises, in contrast, the environ-
ment in which these strategic interactions take place.8 Transnational historical
materialist scholarship, in particular, has focused on the significant role of e´lite
clubs in shaping world politics.9 From this perspective, such clubs belong to the
political organisation of capitalism on a transnational basis. Most studies remain
elusive, however, as to how such clubs concretely impinge on society and on
where lie the limits of their power. In this respect, the case of the WEF is
frequently mentioned in the literature, but there has as yet been no substantial
research done on its role in the present world.10
This article argues that the power exercised by transnational e´lite clubs is
intrinsically bounded by the concrete modalities of their practice. By assuming
that they de facto involve a high constituency of power, it proposes to shift the
focus of investigation away from a search for evidence of power towards a
perspective that could be defined as a hermeneutics of limits. Building upon the
concept of social myth forged by the French thinker Georges Sorel, it posits that
the separation of transnational e´lite clubs from the public sphere constitutes both
their strength and their weakness. Their organisational principles entail a
clear-cut cleavage between a coopted minority and the formal institutions of
representative democracy. This scission is supposed to arouse the sense of an
exclusive community and, therefore, to reinforce the idea of its shared responsi-
bility towards the future of the world. Yet it also impinges upon the capacity to
institutionalise the views held within those confined circles. This has been well
illustrated by the difficulties that the WEF has encountered recently. The more
the influence of the WEF is perceived, the harder it will be for it to pretend to
a legitimate role in the shaping of world-wide issues in the future.
The argument is divided into six sections. The first provides a brief overview
of the scholarship on transnational e´lite clubs, with a particular emphasis on
transnational historical materialist approaches. The second elaborates the rel-
evance of the Sorelian concept of social myth to complement those approaches.
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The third introduces the case of the WEF. The fourth section provides an
historical account of its origins and shows how it was from the outset an attempt
to forge a synthesis between social myth and hegemonic planning. The fifth
examines how this original setting developed into a success story. The sixth
analyses the current difficulties of the Forum, the limits of its influence and its
inability to engage reforms securing its future. The conclusion wraps up the
argument and considers the implications for our understanding of global change
and power, with particular emphasis on the emergence of private authority in
international affairs.
The structural power of transnational e´lite clubs
Activist groups and academic scholars have explored how transnational e´lite
clubs may play a significant role in world politics. Whilst the former tend to
undertheorise the power of those clubs and may use questionable evidence in
pursuit of their arguments, the latter tend to undertheorise the practice of those
clubs and have provided few detailed studies on the way they shape the political
economy of the present world. Studies of transnational e´lite clubs also reflect
different schools of thought. Liberal approaches mostly focus their analysis on
the role of leaders on issues of coordination and efficiency.11 Constructivists
address social settings, institutions and identification processes that impinge on
the social construction of collective action.12 Poststructuralists focus more
specifically on the link between discursive practices and their disciplinary
effects.13 Each of these approaches contributes on its own terms to a better
understanding of the role of e´lites in solving collective action dilemmas, in
disciplining society through discursive power, or in mediating between the
increasingly competitive spheres of authority in the international realm. They
fail, however, to capture the structural power involved in the interactions
between states and non-state actors. It is not a matter of resources, outcomes and
distribution of relational power focused on decision-making processes across
issue areas; nor of additional layers of governance whose functions would
complement traditional state functions. As suggested by Higgott et al., ‘the
relationships between states and non-state actors [are] sometimes conflicting, but
often symbiotic’.14
Transnational historical materialist approaches provide a persuasive expla-
nation of why state and non-state actors should be considered as a joint
expression of one broad configuration of structural power. From this perspective,
transnational e´lite clubs are class organisations belonging to the means of
reproduction of the power of capital just as states do. They are class organisa-
tions in that they can be defined in terms of their relationship to the structures
of capitalist societies. As suggested by Cox, however, class analysis is not per
se Marxism: more broadly, the concept of class implies that relations of social
and political inequalities ‘converge into the relations of the production pro-
cess’.15 As Sklair points out with regard to the salience of the transnational
capitalist class, the concept of class sheds light on the political agency of
globalisation: ‘globalization, like its main driving force, capitalism on a world
scale, does not just happen. It is thought out, organized, managed, promoted, and
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defended against its opponents by identifiable groups of people working in
identifiable organizations.’16 Being enshrined in the class structure of capitalist
societies, transnational e´lite clubs reproduce the structural inequality between
those who control the physical and financial assets of the means of production
and those who create surplus value to accumulate these assets. Their contribution
to the power of capital takes two interrelated courses. On the one hand, they
reinforce the formation of an overall capitalist class consciousness that tran-
scends inter-capitalist rivalries and embraces the global dimension of the
capitalist mode of production ‘based on the exploitation of others’ work’.17 On
the other hand, they constitute a privileged locus for expanding this worldview
to subordinated classes in such a way that it could be seen as one expression,
among others, of the general interest.
According to Gill, transnational e´lite clubs constitute a ‘strategic element
within globalizing capitalism’.18 A proper theorisation of their power differs
from a conspiracy theory:
These private international relations councils are not shadow
governments of plutocrats manipulating international relations.
Rather, they are consciousness-raising forums where individuals
representing elements of the state and civil society in affiliated
countries can come to know and influence each other…. Private
councils are part of a much wider international process of elite
familiarisation and fraternisation, mutual education and, broadly
speaking, networking.19
Gill draws upon Gramsci’s writing on the role of intellectuals in developing
class consciousness and on some of his less known remarks on the status of
e´lites in representative democracies. According to Gramsci, the liberal principle
of one–man–one–vote dismisses the fact that ‘ideas and opinions are not
spontaneously “born” in each individual brain: they have had a centre of
formation, of irradiation, of dissemination, of persuasion’.20 Van der Pijl also
identifies transnational planning groups as class organisations playing a crucial
role in ‘developing common strategies and adjusting the hegemonic concept of
control’.21 According to this author, the World Economic Forum can even be
considered as ‘the most comprehensive transnational planning body operative
today, … a true International of capital, the first identifiable forum in which
concepts of control are debated and if need be, adjusted, on a world scale’.22
It has now been widely recognised in the literature that Gramscian-inspired
interpretations of hegemony closely related to transnational historical materialist
approaches provide ways to emphasise the importance of consent in a structural
understanding of power on a global scale. Whilst these approaches offer the
analytical tools to theorise the overall coherence required to situate the relation-
ship between state and non-state actors, few detailed studies of transnational e´lite
clubs have so far been inspired by such a perspective. With the exception of
Gill’s study of the Trilateral Commission and van Apeldoorn’s research on the
European Round Table of Industrialists,23 such clubs are frequently mentioned in
the literature, but always briefly, with no substantial research, and, like activist
dissemination of information, with a tendency to reproduce in loops a limited
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number of original sources. This can be partly explained by the factual limit in
the number of instances whose influence is situated beyond the traditional role
of lobbies. The methodological problems related to the access to sources, be it
confidential documents or global e´lites for interview, constitute another
difficulty. Moreover, according to van der Pijl, a detailed study focused on one
organisation would underestimate the overlapping and metamorphoses that
characterise transnational planning groups in the longue dure´e: ‘class organisa-
tions constantly readjust to the real balance of forces confronting them’.24 The
World Economic Forum, as one of the most prominent venues in this context,
is nevertheless sufficiently important to deserve its own detailed analysis.
More importantly, the existing studies fail to capture the specific practices of
transnational e´lite clubs. The Gramscian concept of hegemony and the evidence
of networking among e´lites on an international scale do not specifically explain
why some networks are more successful than others. It is crucial to identify what
concretely enables the hegemonic function of certain instances and not others.
What is lacking, then, is a proper theory of the process of socialisation in which
such practices of power take place.
Social myth and hegemonic power
The myth created by the gathering together of a high-powered network plays a
crucial role in both the strength and weakness of transnational e´lite clubs. The
notion of myth does not here refer to the part of illusion (as strong as that might
be) conveyed by e´lite clubs.25 It refers to the concept of social myth forged by
Georges Sorel in his Reflections on Violence (first published in 1906) and
revisited by Gramsci in his writings on hegemony. As Augelli and Murphy have
pointed out, for international relations scholars influenced by Gramsci, Sorel’s
concept provides insights on how leaders attempt ‘to motivate collective political
action that would maintain or transform a significant aspect of world order’.26
Although Sorel never properly defines social myths, he refers on several
occasions to the ‘expression of a will to act’, ‘the expression of the conviction
of a whole group in the language of movement’ or even to a ‘sublime
undertaking’.27 Ultimately, it is the scission of one class from another in an
environment of all-encompassing collective passion which, in Sorel’s view,
raises consciousness.28
The concept of social myth aims, then, to capture the mobilising power
prompted by the formation of collective consciousness which takes place, as in
classical drama, within an extreme compression of time, site and action. This
concept inspired the early thoughts of Gramsci on proletarian auto-emancipation
(‘ouvrierism’). Later, despite the bolshevisation of the Italian Communist Party
in the 1920s banning the merits of proletarian spontaneism, it gained ground in
Gramsci’s concept of historic bloc as a congruence of social forces politically
organised to exert hegemonic power through consent rather than through
coercion. According to Sorel, much as primitive Christianity held to the myth
of the second coming as the driving force of its struggle against the Roman
empire, the general strike can be viewed as a social myth fostering class
consciousness among workers and reinforcing their revolutionary fervour. It
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draws its strength from the rupture with a culture of repeated compromises and,
consequently, the clear case for a separation of the proletariat from other social
classes: ‘society is truly divided in two camps, and only two, on the battle field’;
accordingly, a social myth ‘locks itself … into one indivisible unit’.29
Transnational e´lite clubs provide a mirror image of the same principle. As Cox
points out in respect of the ways social myths can be a feature of many historical
and contemporary groups, ‘the content of the myth is less important than its
mobilizing power for sharpening the lines of conflict and stimulating action for
change’.30 By drawing a clear line between those included and those excluded,
e´lite clubs rely on a total cleavage between those sufficiently powerful to interact
behind closed doors and those having no place in such exclusive arenas. The
mobilisation of creative forces takes place in a confined space cut off from the
public sphere. Due to the de facto position of power held by the participants, the
privatised environment of e´lite clubs is vested with the capacity to bring about
change in society at large. This is what catch-phrases like ‘meeting place of the
masters of the world’ attempt to convey.
Yet the concept of social myth may explain not only the power of transna-
tional e´lite clubs, but also its limits. It underscores a spontaneous and non-insti-
tutional understanding of social practice. The impetus for social change rests on
the realm of the possible as available to individuals involved in the action. It can
be the expression of their ‘will to act’, but not the will of the social forces which
propelled them. It can give way to some organisational outcome in the form of
initiatives, working groups, councils or task forces. To be more than mere
managerial outcomes, it must engage with the more formal processes of political
institutionalisation and the role of the state. In his study of the ‘Dreyfus Affair’,
which so deeply affected France’s Third Republic at the turn of the twentieth
century, Sorel was well aware that a spontaneous understanding of social myth
would result in a quandary. He fully recognised the relationship that prevails
between the rise of consciousness taking place in a social myth and the longer
planning process needed to build a political and ideological leadership conducive
to deeper institutional change. In his view, civil law was the key target: he noted
that ‘in a situation of total calm, when the future is assured, one can educate the
new generation to the idea that the new regime rests on incontestable theories of
civil law’.31 Although denied by Gramsci, these observations suggest that Sorel
saw an intimate connection between social myth and hegemonic leadership.32 In
his reading they appear as mutually related and stretch along a continuum
bounded, on the one hand, by the pure vanity of actors falsely believing
themselves autonomous agents of change and, on the other, the public institu-
tions providing a broad measure of consent on a global and comprehensive scale
to the dominance of the particular configuration of forces in control of the
financial and material basis of social life. Whereas the conquest of hegemonic
leadership relies on the mobilising effect of social myths, social myths as such
are insufficient for achieving hegemony. As Charzat points out, ‘great collective
passion … can accelerate the realisation of the new society, provided that it was
preceded by a patient and systematic engagement with existing institutions’.33
Thus, in making this argument about the limits of power of transnational e´lite
clubs, two basic assumptions are involved. First, the ability of transnational e´lite
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clubs to exercise real power beyond private deals and one-off trade-offs is
mediated by public institutions and social mobilisation. Although they can pool
huge resources, the outcome will always have unintended consequences follow-
ing the mobilising power of social forces excluded from the definition of the
collective will supposedly shared within the confines of the club. Second, the
limits of their power is circumscribed by what, in Gramscian terms, would be
called transformism. This concept refers to a particular feature of ‘passive
revolution’ where the introduction of change does not involve an active mobil-
isation of popular forces. Instead it leads toward a crystallisation of unresolved
contradictions brought together in the widest possible coalition of interests, in
particular through the cooptation of potential leaders of subaltern groups and the
assimilation in a more innocuous form of their most subversive discourse.34
Transformism is an integral part of a managerial understanding of power seeking
to rebalance the deep social tensions arising out of global capitalism.35 Some
initiatives may indeed lead to real outcomes once they have passed into more
formal channels of public life. Yet such an informal network of influence can
only rarely replace a more comprehensive and socially-defined concept of power
in the global political economy.
It is within this framework that the role of the World Economic Forum must
be viewed. The remainder of this article will attempt to assess how the social
myth of capitalist consciousness has underpinned the successful history of the
WEF, how far it is inscribed in the various institutions providing hegemonic
leadership to the present world, and to what extent the problems that the WEF
has encountered more recently reflect the intrinsic limits to the power of such
closed transnational e´lite clubs cut off, as they are, from the representative
institutions of public life.
The case of the World Economic Forum
The official history of the World Economic Forum conveys the social myth of
spontaneous change effected by the sense of community shared among the WEF
participants. The grounding of the myth lies in the close merger of economic and
political leadership within the three unities of classical drama: place, time and
action. The unity of place rests on the difficulty of access to the Alpine resort,
which for the period of the conference looks like an enclosed site. By metonymy,
Davos is the World Economic Forum for a week every winter. The unity of time
derives from the relatively uncompressible time spent by the e´lites taking part in
the gathering due to this difficulty of access. Apart from the ‘super-VIPs’ who
come and go by helicopter, participants generally stay for at least three days.
Finally, the unity of action hinges on the absence of the distractions to be found
in the global cities usually frequented by transnational e´lites. In Davos, apart
from skiing, there is nothing else to do during the time of the conference except
meet other participants.
According to the self-proclaimed vision of the WEF, it is the collective
passion emanating from such a high-density networking environment that creates
the ‘spirit of Davos’: the magic of impromptu meetings ends up implementing
the official WEF mission of being ‘committed to improving the state of the
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world’. The social myth of capitalist consciousness has indeed sustained the
success story of the WEF. The concrete practice of the annual meetings of the
WEF suggests, however, that it is less a planning organisation of global
capitalism than, more modestly, a polymorph platform of intermediations on the
new frontiers of capitalism. This assumption is reflected in the motivations of the
participants that stretch along a continuum from pure vanity to strategic plan-
ning, passing by the search for the trend in fashionable topics, the establishment
of key contacts, cutting deals, or improving their influence on some policy
process. According to Lewis Lapham, the former editor of Harper’s Magazine
who summarised his experience in a short book, the ritual of Davos is so
desperate that it resembles the Agony of Mammon in Wagner’s Parzifal.36 Yet,
for a frequent-flyer like Jacques Attali, the former special adviser to the French
President Franc¸ois Mitterrand, the Forum is ‘a time-saving hotel keeper of
business trips’.37 Finally, according to an academic ‘Forum Fellow’, ‘nobody
comes here to think; some come to do business and we do not see them; some
come on the contrary to use the Forum as a powerful launching pad for balloons;
and everyone is playing a mirror game to measure the wavelength of the
moment’.38
The following account suggests that the power embodied by such closed
transnational e´lite clubs has intrinsic limits, because of its divorce from the
legitimate institutions of public life. We shall stress that the social myth of the
Forum does not exist independently from the various instruments of a more
institutionalised process of hegemonic formation. The fact that the WEF is
institutionally cut off from the formal public institutions of the global political
economy is what creates both its strength and its weakness.
The origins of Davos
Klaus Schwab, Founder-President of the WEF, is particularly anxious to person-
ify on his own the origin of a spontaneous social myth. The official history of
the beginning of the WEF invariably mentions the personal initiative and the
financial risk taken by him. According to the WEF website, ‘in 1970, Klaus
Schwab, Professor of Business Administration, took the initiative and the
personal risk to convene Europe’s chief executives to an informal gathering in
the Swiss mountain town of Davos in January 1971, to discuss a coherent
strategy for European business to face challenges in the international market-
place’.39 This story circulates year after year in the media coverage of the WEF.
Yet the historical evidence clearly impairs this version and gives considerably
more weight to the institutional context in which the creation of the WEF took
place.
The World Economic Forum has its origins in the Centre d’Etudes Indus-
trielles (CEI) of Geneva. Aside from IPSOA (Istituto Post-Universitario per gli
Studi di Organizzazione Aziendale) established in 1952 in Turin by Fiat, IMEDE
(Institut pour l’Etude des Me´thodes de Direction d’Entreprise) founded in 1957
by Nestle´ in Lausanne, Switzerland, and INSEAD (Institut Europe´en
d’Administration des Affaires) set up in 1959 by the Paris Chamber of Com-
merce, the CEI was one of the four executive business schools that had a key
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role in the managerial revolution following the Marshall Plan in Europe. It was
created in 1946 by Alcan—the Canadian subsidiary created for the international
operations of the American aluminium firm Alcoa—as a training centre for the
future international careers of its managers. In the late 1960s the CEI was
loosening its relationship with Alcan and was becoming a key pole of com-
petence in management with worldwide ties.40
It is against this background that Klaus Schwab joined other new young staff
in 1969 to give additional purchase to the restructuring of the school.41 As a
junior member of faculty, he was quickly invited to take charge of the fastidious
preparation of the 25th anniversary of the CEI planned for 1971. Instead of a
standard dinner, he suggested celebrating the event by organising a large
conference. The idea of Davos came through the contacts he had there through
his father, a German industrialist. The format of the conference, however, was
not original. Professional conferences organised in remote areas along the
principle of the three unities of place, time and action were already fashionable
during the 1960s. Moreover, the organisation and the content of the panels of the
first Davos symposium were close to the topics offered in the programmes of the
CEI and most of the invited speakers had already lectured in some CEI
programmes. The conference could not have attracted the big names of the
American business schools and a number of high profile European industrialists
without the reputation of the CEI, considered at the time as the most prestigious
management school in Europe and the only truly international one.42
Whilst the name and the address book of the CEI are closely related to the first
Davos symposium, Klaus Schwab conceived with one of his associates, Duri
Capaul, an artful legal artifice to keep control of the event. They created a
private company, International Education Services, and sent a letter to the
Director of the CEI to present the contractual relationships that the CEI would
have with that company for the organisation of the event. It remains unclear
whether the Director realised that with his signature he agreed to invert the roles
and responsibilities of both parties. However that may be, the terms and
conditions of the arrangement signified that it was not the CEI that gave to its
most junior faculty member the task of organising the celebrations of the 25th
anniversary of the Centre but, on the contrary, that company which was in
charge of the event:
International Education Services (IES), as the initiator and organ-
iser of the European Management Symposium (EMS), owns all
rights concerning the realisation of the EMS.
IES will have full rights to use CEI’s name, and unlimited use of
its know-how [for the organisation of the symposium] …
We have a direct contract with Klaus Schwab, making him fully
responsible for the project of EMS. We understand that all
decisions at the CEI regarding the symposium will be delegated
to KS [Klaus Schwab].43
This legal basis granted Klaus Schwab the right to create at the time of the first
symposium the not-for-profit Foundation of the European Management Forum as
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the umbrella organisation that would subsequently assure him complete indepen-
dence from the CEI for the future.
This was the true beginning of the World Economic Forum. The CEI was well
aware that the success of the event was beyond the dissemination of the latest
management techniques of the USA throughout the European entrepreneurial
culture. The need for some loose and informal framework of strategic business
planning was strongly felt: ‘although the Symposium did not come up with
resolutions or proposals—it was not meant to—it did leave with this group of
executives the idea that perhaps businessmen need such vehicles for planning on
a broad front, at least to parallel soon the planning mechanisms so briskly
established by governments, within and across borders’.44 In the only major
newspaper article covering the event, the message was well received: ‘the
manager of tomorrow must be a social architect’.45
Hence, from the outset, the Forum explored the groundwork for an original
synthesis between social myth and hegemonic planning. The specific club
atmosphere in which e´lites can share their views should not only be used for the
particular interests of the various fractions of capital, but also for the general
interest of capitalism. It is against this background that the Forum quickly
expanded its scope beyond managerial questions to develop an agenda including
macroeconomic, political and strategic issues.
The golden years of the myth
In 1987 the Foundation of the European Management Forum changed its name
to the World Economic Forum. The new denomination reflects an important shift
in the internal organisation and objectives of the Foundation. Until then, the
Board was made up of four low profile associates of Klaus Schwab. Its
membership would henceforth include chief executive officers (CEOs) from
major multinational corporations such as Nestle´, Dell, Coca-Cola, BP, ABB,
Vivendi and Enron.46 The core organisational and commercial basis of the
Forum would no longer rely on management experts paid to offer their
knowledge to business leaders; the largest multinational corporations would
henceforth pay to take advantage of a network that condenses in one place and
at one time the world-wide coverage of their operations and to disseminate their
own worldview.47 It is in this respect that the Foundation has increasingly
mingled management scholars with consulting professionals, columnists, high
profile CEOs and political leaders. As the former Vice-President of the Board
notes, ‘the strategic thinking at the origin of Davos would henceforth abandon
its intellectual roots to embrace the thinking of the big names’.48
In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s there was a large increase in the
number and prestige, as well as in the geographical and sectoral origins, of the
participants. The number of participants moved from less than a thousand to
more than three thousand, half of whom are invited by the Foundation to animate
panels, lend a high profile to the network and ensure the highest possible
repercussion in e´lite circles, the media and broader public opinion.49 These
guests include several hundreds of political leaders and high-ranking officials, as
well as ‘Forum Fellows’ chosen from academic scholars, executive officers of
research foundations and around 500 editors and columnists of press groups
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around the world. The apogee of the prestige of participants to the Forum was
probably reached in 2000 when for the first time the President of the United
States, William J. Clinton, took part in the event with nine other political leaders
of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The geographical origin of the participants reflects three distinct features.50
First, the prestige of Davos led to a rapid development of regional forums that
strengthened the relationship between the core participants of the annual meet-
ings in Davos and various regional business networks. This trend was also
extremely useful for attracting new participants to the annual meetings. Second,
not surprisingly, the Americans gained a significant prominence all through the
1990s to constitute at the end of the decade more than a third of the participants.
According to the Financial Times, when in 2002 the Forum took place for the
first time out of Davos and moved to New York, ‘the US corporate presence was
so overwhelming that it [the forum] no longer had the feel of a truly international
gathering’.51 Finally, medium-sized countries are generally over represented.
Ironically, this focus on the new frontier of capitalism often takes place in the
year preceding the crisis that would hit the country pushed to the forefront.52 As
with the Regional Forums, these participants usually do not show much incli-
nation towards the philanthropic message of Davos. As one regular academic
participant to the annual meetings notes with euphemism, ‘the Forum invests
heavily in the emerging markets, like Turkey, Portugal, Mexico, or South Africa,
but a number of participants from these countries are second-tier’.53
The sectoral origins of the participants to the Forum reflect the increasing
power of financial capital and the boom in information and telecommunication
sectors that took place during those years. An ever-increasing number of CEOs
from multinational banks fraternise not only with CEOs of major industrial
firms, but also with finance ministers and governors of central banks, be it from
OECD or developing countries. Moreover, the huge logistical challenge of the
annual meeting has always constituted a showroom for the technology of the
future. The meeting is used to demonstrate its potential and to convince business
and political leaders to adopt a coherent strategy for attaining a level of
profitability after the huge sums already spent in research and development.
Klaus Schwab, who was trained as an engineer, seems to be fascinated by
technology. According to the following pronouncement, it could provide vital
answers to the most urgent problems of the world:
If the WEF is ‘committed to improve the state of the world’, it
must address its most crucial challenges by keeping pace with its
latest developments. While the whole way in which societies
lived radically changed with the Industrial Revolution some 150
years ago, we now face a twin revolution of Electronics and
Genetics. The E-revolution marks a radical shift in with whom we
communicate. The G-revolution marks a radical shift of who we
are. The key challenge is thus how to maintain a collective
identity.54
Notwithstanding the self-congratulatory tone of the message, this ready-made
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language suggests that the technological showroom of the annual meetings of
Davos is clearly associated with a general interest in the future of capitalism.
The fading star of the myth and the fallacy of hegemonic workshops
Be that as it may, the social myth of the annual meeting of Davos has recently
been impaired. What once made the success of the WEF is on the verge of
engendering its failure. This is reflected in both the internal and external
challenges faced by the WEF. Internally, as far as the concrete practice of the
meeting is concerned, the event has reached such a gigantic scale that paradox-
ically this undermines the chances to make connections. At the core of the social
myth of Davos lies the principle that each participant is thought to be part of a
sufficiently important e´lite to have exclusive and non-discriminatory access to
the most compact network of the world. Belonging to the community allows
networking without any prearranged appointment. However, the huge size of the
event and the number of meetings planned in advance has considerably under-
mined this principle. Prior insertion in the network largely determines the
possibility of taking advantage of it. As Jacques Attali notes, the best strategy
to organise your time in Davos is ‘to accept in advance more invitations than the
existing number of lunches and dinners and pick and chose at the last moment
which one provides the best opportunity’.55 This type of behaviour considerably
limits the range of incidental connections. Consequently, the Forum abolishes far
fewer hierarchies than it pretends and its network is considerably less open than
suggested.
The growth strategy pursued since the mid 1980s has also increased the
visibility of the hidden face of the myth. Business deals and corporatist
behaviour are far from new, but the weight of corporate interests in the panels
and the means deployed to communicate and strike deals in Davos have lately
been out of proportion to the WEF mission commitment of ‘improving the state
of the world’. This problem has become crucial since the end the 1990s. Media
coverage of the meetings clearly reflects this shift. The newspapers viewed as the
most prestigious by the world business community have themselves contributed
to tarnishing the image of the WEF. In 2000 the Wall Street Journal and the
Washington Post published in-depth investigations on the for-profit activities in
which the supposedly not-for-profit WEF Foundation was involved.56 Over the
past few years the Financial Times has for its part started making ironic
comments on the ability of the WEF to incarnate the general interest. In 2002,
it described this as the ‘Bono factor’, in reference to the Irish rock star urging
his fellow participants to pay more attention to the tragic situation of Africa:
The Bono factor is the anxiety among the Davos delegates to
demonstrate that despite their extraordinary collective wealth and
power … they care about the blight of poverty in the world and
want to do something about it. It is the Davos guilty con-
science…. and yet. It is hard to escape the feeling that for all the
earnest discussion and knotted brows, what Davos is really about
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for most participants is the chance to make connections and do
business.57
There can be little doubt that the size of the event and the declining public image
of the Forum have induced a risk of defection of participants disappointed by the
atmosphere of a besieged and overcrowded fortress. Several participants to the
2001 edition admitted to feeling rather troubled by the scale of security measures
and determined to think twice about returning.58 In 2003 the organisers decided
on ‘Building Trust’ as the core theme of the event, but the loss of trust in both
internal corporate duties and the wider world could not offset the low turnout
and sombre tone.59 Such trends could quickly jeopardise the financial basis of the
Forum and seriously undermine its future since multinational corporations pay
for all non-corporate participation and for the lavish Secretariat of the Foun-
dation.
The WEF is also facing a crucial external challenge. Such a compact and
confined gathering constitutes a quasi-natural target for the social movements
opposing neoliberal globalisation. After the successful struggle against the
planned Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) in 1998, the big demon-
strations that took place during the Group of Seven (G7) meeting of Cologne in
1999 and the battle of Seattle during the World Trade Organization Ministerial
Meeting later that year, the 2000 edition of the WEF faced, for the first time, a
well-organised opposition. The Swiss NGO ‘Declaration of Bern’ coordinated
the planning of a counter-forum, called ‘Public Eye on Davos’, in which a dozen
other NGOs took part. By echoing the principles of freedom, democracy and
transparency of the official Forum, the organiser of the counter-forum skilfully
gained the attention of dozens of bored journalists. The image of a group of
activists in snowsuits and looking at the Kongresshaus of the Forum through
their binoculars circulated around the world and brought a touch of originality
to the yearly ritual of the Davos press coverage. As is the case with most major
summits around the world, the counter-summit was accompanied by demonstra-
tions that from a discrete beginning in the early 1990s quickly gained importance
by the end of the decade. Geographical conditions and security measures
combine to bar large demonstrations in Davos itself, and yet, in 2001, violent
clashes took place when the demonstrators were turned back by the security
forces and marched on Zurich, the financial centre of Switzerland. In 2003, the
same scenario took place and affected Bern, the capital of the country.
In the context of these internal and external pressures, the future of the WEF
is at risk. The Foundation has been planning two types of measures to overcome
these difficulties. First, to keep the social myth of the annual meeting, the
preservation of the club atmosphere safe from the external world must be
secured at all costs. Whilst the security bill was a few hundred thousand Swiss
francs (CHF) in 1997, it soared to several millions in 2001. With the dramatic
consequences of 11 September 2001, negotiations on the security bill for 2002
could not be finalised in time and the organisers were worried that huge
insurance fees would dissuade most of the regular American participants. For the
first time in more than 30 years, the annual meeting of the WEF abandoned
Davos and moved to New York. Although the move was sold to the public as
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an act of solidarity to a wounded city and country, the financial and security
bases of the move proved to have harmful consequences: a global city like New
York could not provide the conditions for a massive club atmosphere; it has no
unity of place, no unity of action and no unity of time. Participants took
advantage of doing other business located in New York and spent a minimum
of time within the actual arena of the Forum. Burdensome negotiations took
place to bring the meeting back to Davos in 2003 with, this time, a security bill
of around CHF15 million, almost entirely covered by local, regional and federal
public finance from Switzerland. Whilst the Forum seems non-exportable (ex-
cept to another confined resort offering the same privileged target for demonstra-
tions), the social and financial cost of assuring its security will remain an object
of acute debate.60
The second set of measures being implemented by the leaders of the
Foundation involves a superior level of institutionalisation. The aim of this move
is to overcome the ephemeral aspect of the social myth conveyed by the annual
meeting and create what I call hegemonic workshops. Small groups of transna-
tional e´lites wrap up initiatives whose direct impact on the course of specific
issues of world politics would serve as examples of consensual solutions to
conflicting situations. As Klaus Schwab put it, the WEF should now ‘shift away
from an event-oriented organisation towards a knowledge- and process-driven
organisation’.61 Likewise, the Director of Communication and Public Affairs of
the WEF replicates the message by stating that ‘the WEF has succeeded as
facilitator of initiatives. Now, it’s time to be more outcome oriented and become
a catalyst.’62 Ahead of the meetings, the participants receive stacks of material,
including analytical notes, original essays and various aggregated data provided
by big consulting firms such as Oxford Analytica and Accenture. The Secretariat
of the Foundation has been restructured to include a system of knowledge
dissemination. Members are solicited to develop projects between themselves,
which, if successful, are later subsidised by the Foundation. Task forces and
initiatives of all sorts have been launched and heavily publicised over the last
few years. While many of them drift apart successively, some of them vie with
other initiatives to bring new evidence to influence the policy agenda. In this
domain, the self-proclaimed flagship of the WEF is the document presented by
the Digital Divide Task Force to the 2000 Okinawa G7 Summit as a draft
proposal for ensuring the inclusion of poor countries in the so-called digital
economy.
Notwithstanding the genuine steps taken by the Forum to react to the new
challenges it faces, three problems, at least, prevail. First, private meetings and
connections to be made will for self-evident reasons remain the prime motivation
to pay the costly bill to take part in the events organised by the Forum.
Hegemonic workshops could at most complement, but in no way supplant the
annual and/or regional meetings. Second, a hegemonic process supposes the
ability of the ruling e´lite to include broader elements of the society in the goal
to obtain widespread acceptance of its claim to embody the general interest.
This, in turn, implies relinquishing cleavages that have contributed to the success
of the social myth of Davos. The club atmosphere has, indeed, been broadened
towards individuals from subordinated interests. In the context of a growing
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hostility, in 2000 the Forum invited a few NGO leaders to join the five or six
union leaders regularly present at Davos. In 2001 around 30 of them took part
in the event and represented around one per cent of all participants. They
included the best known critics of the moment, such as Thilo Bode of Green-
peace, Martin Khor of Third World Network, Lori Wallach of Public Citizen,
and Vandana Shiva of the Research Foundation for Science. They all publicly
denounced the repressive policies used against the demonstrators and collec-
tively laid down a number of conditions for renewing their participation in the
Forum. As a result, in 2002, most were either not invited or declined the offer.63
Greenpeace, for instance, rejected the invitation once it was clear that its
representatives would be kept out of the meetings of the task force to which they
were officially associated. The mutual trust on which the whole club atmosphere
hinges was clearly destroyed.64 For activist leaders, the place to be henceforth
was not Davos, but Porto Alegre in Brazil, with its competing World Social
Forum.
Third, the new institutional processes of the Forum not only exclude subordi-
nated interests of transnational capital; they also fail to raise class consciousness
among the very individuals who take part in those practices. Most of the
initiatives use the workforce of those constituents of the Foundation called
‘Global Leaders of Tomorrow’. These so-called GLTs are individuals of less
than 40 years old who are considered to have demonstrated significant skill in
their respective domain of excellence, be it economic, political, academic,
cultural or religious. About a hundred of them are invited each year to take part
in the annual meeting for five years running. To ensure being part of the club
beyond this timeframe, either the company they lead is given the status of
member by the Foundation and pays its fees, or, as individuals, they get the
status of Forum Fellow and continue to be invited. However, if they have not
added what is considered a significant value to the activities of the Forum within
this deadline, they are excluded. Such rules reinforce personal ambitions and
competing practices in the work of the task forces. As one GLT put it, ‘there is
too much ego, with individuals who always try to manipulate the project in their
own interest. Under these conditions, you’d better remain cautious and not
distribute information that others will just use to raise their own profile.’65 Such
behaviour reflects an exemplary lack of class consciousness. It prevents GLTs
from overcoming their individual interests in the collective interest of capital
coordination. It strongly contradicts the effort of the leaders of the WEF
Foundation to develop hegemonic workshops which would transcend the in-
herent weakness of the social myth of the annual meetings.
Conclusions
This article has analysed the World Economic Forum as a test case of private
authority exercised on a global scale by informal and weakly institutionalised
non-state actors such as transnational e´lite clubs. The World Economic Forum
presumably reflects the archetype of the most exclusive and powerful transna-
tional e´lite club. Its success story hinges on the opportunities for networking
within the three unities of place, time and action of the annual meetings in, or
of, ‘Davos’. The sense of an exclusive community is particularly important for
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all the second-tier businesspeople paying a costly participation fee for lining up
meetings, cutting deals and savouring the opportunity to meet top political
figures. Among high-profile e´lites, it is also an efficient infrastructure for piling
up appointments, solving urgent matters and ensuring a broad repercussion of
their message in e´lite circles, the media and wider public opinion. Yet the article
suggests that the World Economic Forum faces intrinsic limits to its power. I
have drawn upon Sorel’s concept of social myth to examine how the actual
practices and organisational principles of transnational e´lite clubs impair their
power. Following Sorel’s argument, the collective passion underpinning the
energy released during the meetings of the WEF lacks institutional basis. Despite
the continuing force of attraction it exerts on world leaders, recent developments
give further evidence of this weakness: the bigger the suggested influence of a
transnational e´lite club, the greater the problems to legitimise its informal power.
The sheer size of the meetings, the huge media coverage and better organised
opposition all contribute toward jeopardising the peculiar club atmosphere that
made the WEF so successful. In this respect the current attempt by the officials
of the Foundation to bridge the gap between the loose influence of a closed club
and a more focused engagement with states, intergovernmental organisations and
society at large appears largely irrelevant.
Three broader implications for the study of our present world may ensue from
the approach developed in this article. First, the insight of Sorel’s concept of
social myth helps us to develop a better understanding of global change. As Cox
has pointed out, ‘the real achievement of [international political economy] was
not to bring in economics, but to open up a critical investigation into change in
historical structure’.66 Transnational historical materialist approaches have en-
abled scholarship to open up the sovereign state and situate the agents of change
in terms of their relations to the structures of capitalist societies. Herein lies the
relevance of class analyses for shedding light on the agents of globalisation
regarding the inequality between those who control the financial and material
basis of social life and those who create the surpluses to accumulate these
means. The concept of social myth specifies the conditions for strengthening
class consciousness by exploring the unique undertaking that occurs when
individuals are involved in a major collective action clearly separating social
groups. The mobilisation draws its strength from the situation of total cleavage
in the sense of identity shared by people between themselves and towards the
future. As we have seen, however, Sorel recognised that structural change in
society would only occur if deeper institutional processes are also engaged.
This brings us to the second point: the notion of power. The Gramscian-
inspired concept of hegemony has now gained wide currency among scholars
who seek to explore the comprehensive trade-offs taking place within the
structural power of the global political economy. As Germain and Kenny have
highlighted, however, a considerable amount of reinterpretation is necessary
when transposing Gramscian concepts.67 There is a lack of clear understanding
of the mechanics of hegemony, the concrete course that eventually leads to the
implementation of a global order. Here again Sorel’s concept of social myth
contributes to a more socialised understanding of Gramscian-inspired analyses of
hegemonic power and counter-hegemonic movements. As we have seen, social
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myths and hegemonic leadership can be appraised as two ends of a continuum
between, on the one hand, vain agents overemphasising their ability to transform
the world and, on the other, public institutions providing consent to the
dominance of a particular configuration of forces.
The third point relies more specifically on the private dimension of power.
Private actors have now firmly entered into the scholarship on globalisation.
Yet, as Higgott et al. remark, ‘depending on the particular understanding of
globalisation adopted, the exact distribution of authority between actors
differs’.68 The clear assumption is that the current realignment cannot simply
be explained by the empirical context of the dramatic changes that have
recently taken place on a world-wide scale. It is rather the theoretical perspec-
tive adopted that will underpin the power of new categories of non-state
actors in the global realm. By pointing to the intrinsic limits of power
capabilities divorced from the legitimate institutions of public life, Sorel may
prove helpful in shifting the theoretical agenda away from providing evidence
of power towards what I have called a hermeneutics of limits. In this regard
transnational e´lite clubs constitute a model. They bring together individuals
who are in de facto positions of power, even though a whole range of hierarchies
is also present behind their closed doors. Sorel’s perspective is important
in relativising the conclusions drawn by transnational historical materialist
approaches on this issue. Elite clubs do indeed provide informal platforms
for networking and delicate economic and political negotiations. They also
provide a useful milieu for individuals concerned to bring about the strategic
advancement of a cosmopolitan, long-term future of capitalism. Yet their role
in the public sphere clashes with the limits of their organisational principles.
Divorced from society at large and with no formal devolution of power,
paradoxically their influence emphasises their lack of legitimacy and there-
fore their inability to compete in the public debate. Sooner or later this
situation will foster the development of contending forces disputing their very
existence.
This reasoning can be extended to other private actors claiming wider public
recognition on various issues and forms of international authority. Private
authority assumes that the power vested in private property and the autonomy of
the subject should not necessarily be mediated by the public sphere in order to
be socially recognised. Unlike classical liberalism, it claims public authority
without directing its resources towards the conventional institutions of the public
sphere. The case for enmeshing public and private realms by accepting or
delegating public tasks to private actors is generally made on expertise,
efficiency or issue-oriented rationales. The catchwords of ‘best practice’, multi-
tiered global governance, or multi-stakeholder dialogue rest on this assumption.
Private and public actors are tied, however, by opposite types of accountability.
The delegation of public tasks to private experts and corporate leaders confers
on them a status equivalent to that of political leaders. Yet it denies them an
equal liability towards citizens. It is in this respect that one must remain wary
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